We conduct an empirical inquiry into the effect of the Supreme Court's 2010 Morrison decision, which limited the reach of US securities laws to trades occurring on US markets, on the competitiveness of US markets as a venue for listings by foreign issuers and trading in cross-listed stocks. In the wake of the Morrison decision, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the SEC inform Congress about the merits of creating a new extraterritorial right of action. We provide input into the debate by using data on 329 shareholder class actions filed against foreign-domiciled companies and discussing the effects of such a right on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. We conclude that, following Morrison, foreign companies' expected litigation costs should fall, because investors who purchased their shares on overseas exchanges will be excluded from classes. By reducing expected litigation costs, Morrison eases a deterrent to US listing by foreign issuers and thereby makers the US a more competitive venue for crosslistings, as well as for the volume in cross-listed stocks.
I. Introduction
Congress will soon consider whether to legislate an extraterritorial private right of action under which purchases would be covered based on whether the investors were American, whether they bought their shares on US markets, and whether and which fraudulent acts had occurred in the US. The Supreme Court nullified these tests on grounds that no US law applies outside the US borders unless the law gives a clear indication that it is intended to apply extraterritorially. This paper provides input into the debate on the merits of creating a new private right of action by reviewing the 329 shareholder class actions filed against foreign-domiciled companies and discussing the effects of such a right on the competitiveness of US capital markets. We focus on Rule 10b-5 shareholder class actions against foreign issuers, which we define to involve suits against a foreign issuer whose stock trades on US markets, on behalf of a plaintiff class that includes both investors who purchased their securities on US markets and investors who purchased their securities overseas. 4, 5 We conclude that, following Morrison, foreign companies' expected litigation costs should fall, because investors who purchased their shares on overseas exchanges will be excluded from classes, driving down damages and settlements.
By reducing expected litigation costs, Morrison eases a deterrent to US listing by foreign issuers and thereby makes the US a more competitive venue for cross-listings, as well as for the volume in cross-listed stocks.
II. Filings Against Non-US Companies in US Courts
US courts have been an attractive venue for plaintiffs to file shareholder class actions, even against companies domiciled in foreign countries. Although other countries have recently 4 Since PSLRA, all Rule 10b-5 securities class actions brought against foreign issuers involved stocks that traded on US markets, whether on an exchange or over the counter ("OTC"); many of these stocks also traded overseas, in some cases with the overwhelming majority of the volume trading outside the US. NERA Securities Class Action Database. 5 The Morrison decision describes broad acceptance that the Exchange Act applied only to stocks traded on US exchanges: "The primacy of the domestic exchange is suggested by the very prologue of the Exchange Act, which sets forth as its object '[t] o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges . . . operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges . . . .' 48 Stat. 881. We know of no one who thought that the Act was intended to 'regulat[e]' foreign securities exchanges-or indeed who even believed that under established principles of international law Congress had the power to do so. The Act's registration requirements apply only to securities listed on national securities exchanges. 15 U. S. C. §78l(a)." Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2874 Ct. (2010 . created a legal framework for class action litigation, including Australia, Canada and Italy, long standing and well-defined class action rules in the US make it a uniquely well-suited venue for this type of litigation.
6 Participating in a class action is essentially a free call option to plaintiffs, removing any downside financial risk as well as the need for plaintiffs to coordinate to fund litigation. US law allows for contingency fee arrangements, where plaintiffs' attorneys fund the litigation and receive a percentage of any damages or settlement. Furthermore, the US does not have the fee-shifting rules common in other countries that require the losing side to pay some or all of the winner's legal fees. As a result, plaintiffs incur no legal expenses to enter litigation and minimal, if any, financial risk. Lead plaintiffs will invest only time in participating and supervising litigation, and there is no cost whatsoever to other class members.
Finally, the jury trial system in the US increases the probability of large verdicts against defendant corporations, should cases go to trial.
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For these reasons, plaintiffs and their attorneys have substantial incentives to file shareholder class actions in the US. Without restrictions on access to US courts, suits might be filed in response to disclosure of fraud against companies from around the world, even without a US listing, provided they involved substantial market capitalization, a large price drop, and good record keeping of stock ownership. 
Filings against Chinese Companies in H1 2011
Historically, companies domiciled in Europe and Canada have accounted for the majority of filings against non-US companies. Figure 2 reports In most years since 1996, foreign companies listing in the US have faced lower odds of a shareholder class action than domestic companies. As Figure 3 shows, in all but four years, foreign companies accounted for a greater percentage of US listings than class action filings.
The greatest outlier, by far, is the first half of 2011, which is driven primarily by the large number of suits against Chinese firms filed this year. Excluding these 27 filings, foreign firms would account for 13.1% of filings in the first half of 2011. 
III. Inclusion of F 3 Investors
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, courts ruled on a case-by-case basis on whether to include so-called foreign-cubed investors ("F 3 "), foreign investors who purchased shares of a foreign-domiciled company on a foreign market, in a class. These rulings followed a common framework, in which courts could decide whether to exclude F 3 investors at two 12 Id. at 43.
13 Id. at 23.
14 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 , 1017 (2d Cir. 1975 and Exchange Act were committed in the US. 15 In contrast, the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits required that acts "more than merely preparatory conduct to the fraud" took place in the US and that the US conduct caused the foreign plaintiffs' loss. 16 The Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits adopted the least stringent standard, requiring only that some conduct designed to further the fraudulent scheme occurred in the US.
17 Figure 6 reports the number of instances, both overall and by region, in which US courts found subject matter jurisdiction over F 3 investors. 
C. Class Certification
Beyond the normal class certification issues, the certification of classes including F 3 investors depends primarily on whether courts in foreign plaintiffs' home countries would hear litigation of the same claims following a US resolution. Courts historically excluded F 3 investors from classes when they found that there was a "near certainty" that courts in plaintiffs' home countries would fail to recognize a judgment or settlement in US courts, with the "near certainty" standard first articulated in Bersch (1975 33 If the US share of volume varies from day to day and prices differ between the US and other markets, the proportion of damages due to US purchases will not exactly equal the US volume share.
for investors to execute their purchases in the US, precisely in order to be eligible to participate in shareholder class actions and be compensated via settlement distributions or damage awards.
Academic research on where cross-listed stocks trade indicates that the demand for US execution is elastic and affected by the relative strength of investor protections in the US versus the home market. 35 Therefore, it is probable that volume in cross-listed stocks will shift to the US.
The competitiveness gains for US listings and US trading execution are, however, offsetting.
Increases in the US share of trading volume in cross-listed stocks will mitigate the expected litigation cost improvement from Morrison. If the US-executed share of volume in the stock discussed above rises from 50% to 60%, the expected litigation cost savings associated with
Morrison will fall from 50% to 40% savings.
A. US competitiveness for global IPOs
The costs of compliance with SOX were widely blamed for a decline in the US share in global IPOs, or public equity offerings by foreign issuers on exchanges outside their home countries.
Since the financial crisis, the debate has shifted to the competitiveness effects of Dodd-Frank.
The US share of global initial offerings has declined by any measure, whether from its peak in In addition to losing global IPOs to markets in other countries, the US public equity markets have lost market share to US 144A private placements. As a share of all global initial offerings, public or 144A, the US still attracts 53% in number and 46% in value, as shown in However, foreign issuers are now overwhelmingly raising equity in the US by 144A private placements, rather than by public offerings. IPOs accounted for 75% of all initial offerings by foreign issuers in 1996-1998, but only 23% in 2009-1H2011. However, companies also incur multiple costs when they list on US public markets:
• Regulatory and compliance costs
• Potential costs due to becoming subject to US enforcement action
• Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance
• Potential class action litigation costs: 24.3% probability of suit in 5 years.
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However, these benefits are not all exclusive to the US. Some of these benefits are also available from listing in other host markets, such as gaining access to international investors.
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Those foreign issuers who access US markets via over-the-counter trading obtain lesser benefits, and incur lower costs. Because they trade on the OTC Bulletin Board or on pink sheets, they do not enjoy the same liquidity as exchange-traded securities. 43 Class action litigation risk is lower, because these markets are unlikely to be found efficient, making cases against issuers whose stocks trade OTC unlikely to survive class certification. As a result, a foreign issuer whose stock trades OTC in the US faces lower odds of a class action filing, and the company's D&O insurance costs presumably reflect this lower risk. Some foreign issuers access the US OTC markets by issuing Level 1 ADRs, so that they are required to make only 40 Halling et al., "Where is the Market? Evidence from Cross-listings in the United States," Review of Financial Studies, 2008, pp. 746, 747, 751, 754, and 755. 41 Calculated using NERA Securities Class Action database. minimal SEC disclosure and minimal GAAP compliance, reducing both the costs and benefits of transparency.
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Private placements offer companies access to US investors without the disclosure or compliance requirements, reporting costs or class action litigation risk associated with listing on a US exchange. However, the private placement market lacks the efficiency of the public markets with limited price transparency, wider bid-ask spreads, and a higher cost of capital, which in turn may deter capital formation. Hail and Leuz (2009) estimated that foreign issuers face a 2.38% higher cost of capital in the 144A market than if they cross-list on a US exchange. 45 Moreover, while they find that foreign issuers' cost of capital falls by between 70
and 120 basis points when they list on a US exchange, private placements have statistically insignificant effects, but in some regressions increase the issuer's cost of capital. (2009), p. 429. They find that OTC ADR listings also reduce cost of capital by between 30 and 70 basis points, but that this effect is not always statistically significant. OTC crosslistings require lesser disclosure than exchange listings. Exchange listings require SEC registration, extensive disclosure in filing Form 20-F, and financial statements reconciled to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); they also make the firm subject to SEC oversight and securities litigation, including class actions under Rule 10b-5. OTC listings involve lesser disclosure, but still make the company subject to SEC enforcement and Rule 10b-5 class actions. Private placements, however, require no SEC registration nor disclosures.
46 Id.
listing. 47 Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2009) 
B. Morrison reduces the litigation cost deterrent to cross-listing
Companies considering a US listing must nonetheless weigh both the cost of capital savings they would enjoy against the additional regulatory and potential litigation costs they would incur. 55 ,56 In 2010, total shareholder class action settlement costs totaled $4.3 billion. 57 As Figure 11 shows, although the average settlement dropped to $23 million in the first half of Going forward, at least some institutional investors are likely to request that their trades in cross-listed stocks be executed in the US, or at least discuss the relative merits of execution in the US versus other markets. Any resulting shift in volume to the US will enhance the volume and liquidity of US markets, and by enhancing liquidity, also promoting a lower cost of capital, which in turn make US markets more competitive.
VI. Conclusion
Morrison eases a deterrent to US listing by foreign issuers by reducing expected litigation costs for cross-listed companies. Unless Congress legislates a new private right of action, Morrison may result in more foreign issuers cross-listing in the US as well as shifting of volume in crosslisted stock to the US. 73 Both effects are favorable to the competitiveness of US markets. 73 Similarly, Morrison may result in a lower rate of delisting by foreign issuers with US listings.
